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Plato’s Geometrical Logic 
Mark Faller
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting with the Pacific Division of the 
American Philosophical Association, March 28, 2003, San Francisco
Socrates’ brief mention of a complex problem in geometrical analysis at Meno (86d-87c) remains 
today a persistent mystery. The ostensible reason for the reference is to provide an analogy for the method 
of hypothesis from the use of hypotheses in analytic geometry. Both methods begin by assuming what is to 
be demonstrated and then show that the assumption leads to a well-founded truth father than something 
known to be false.
But why did Plato pick this particular problem in analysis and why at this particular place in the 
inquiry? For those of us who view the dialogues as pedagogical puzzles for readers of all time to “scour” 
out the subtle and complicated details, this is an unquiet mystery that demands further examination.
In this paper I will defend the claim that Plato had developed a powerful new heuristic method for 
the clarification and resolution of a broad range of philosophical problems. This method, based on the 
techniques of inquiry used in geometry, was a kind of conceptual analysis using geometry as an interpretive 
model to elaborate the allowable structures of logic. I will argue that Plato adopted geometrical 
constructions to navigate the precarious passage between the syntactical and semantic structures in 
philosophical arguments, and that this procedure amounts to a kind of logic of discovery.
My approach in this inquiry will be twofold. I will first attempt to elaborate the precise 
philosophical question that the method of analysis is meant to resolve. I will pay particular attention to any 
critical hurdles that remain intractable within the limits of the conversation itself. I will then look closely at 
the details of the geometrical problem to determine just how it could possibly reflect any light back onto 
the original inquiry.
There have been many other interesting attempts to figure out just what Plato meant by “analysis” 
or the method of hypothesis1. They have all focused completely on the interpretation textual references in 
the dialogues and the commentaries. And they have achieved almost no common ground of assent as to the 
nature of this process. By examining at close quarters the specific problem in geometrical analysis that 
Plato wished to use as his example, I hope to overcome some of the contention that originates from the 
ambiguity of relying merely on the translation of terms.
The Philosophical Problem
In the second half of the dialogue Socrates and Meno examine two independent and seemingly 
contradictory arguments on whether virtue is teachable. The first argument (86c-89c) attempts to 
demonstrate that virtue is teachable since:
If virtue is knowledge then it is teachable
Virtue is knowledge
Virtue is teachable
Socrates, in a side argument had established that since virtue is “good” and that “there is nothing 
good that knowledge does not encompass (87d),” that virtue is a kind of knowledge:
1 Francis Cornford, “Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic VI-VII. (I.), Mind AY. 37-52, Richard Robinson, “Analysis in 
Greek Geometry”, Mind 45: 464-73, Norman Gulley, “Greek Geometrical Analysis”, Phronesis, 3, (1958), Patrick Byrne, 
Analysis and Science in Aristotle, (Albany, 1997), Jaakko Hintikka, and Unto Remes, The Method o f Analysis, (Boston, 1974), 
Michael Mahoney, “Another Look at Greek Geometrical Analysis,” Archives for the History o f Exact Sciences, 5:319-48, 
Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, (Oxford, 1953), Kenneth Dorter, Form and Good in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues, 
(Berkeley), Charles Kahn, Plato's Socratic Dialogues, (Cambridge, 1996).
S: Virtue then, as a whole or in part, is wisdom?
M: What you say, Socrates, seems to me quite right.
The result of this first argument, as arrived at by Meno, seems to be a reasonable solution to his own 
original question: “Necessarily, as I now think, Socrates, and clearly, on our hypothesis, if virtue is 
knowledge, it can be taught (89c).” Meno would not have challenged this result further and would have 
been satisfied to memorize the argument for passage back to Gorgias.
Socrates seems less tolerant of his own offspring: “Perhaps, by Zeus, but may it be that we were not 
right to agree to this (89c)?” He initiates a second argument with the examination of a further hypothesis, 
that “if virtue is teachable, then there would be teachers of it.” After an examination of the empirical issue 
of whether there are in fact any teachers of virtue, the conversants arrive at the inevitable conclusion:
If virtue is teachable then there will be teachers of virtue
There are no teachers of virtue
Virtue is not teachable
This second result is both troubling and ironic. It is troubling for its inconsistency with the result of 
our earlier argument. We have proved that virtue both is and is not teachable.
The irony arises from the way in which these two results are related. Socrates wants to pursue the 
question “what is virtue”. Meno only wants to know whether it is teachable. In the first argument Socrates 
leads Meno to the conclusion that virtue is teachable from the acknowledgment that virtue is a kind of 
knowledge. Socrates challenges this result on the integrity that is does not follow the method of 
hypothesis. The method of hypothesis is utilized precisely to examine the properties of a subject whose 
nature has not been explicitly laid out.
If we are going to resolve the opposing conclusions of these two arguments, we will need to 
examine more closely the precise nature of this method of hypothesis. We will also need to determine how 
the method of hypothesis is in any way illuminated by the procedures of geometrical analysis.
The second half of the Meno - the part which is explicitly stated to be working with the method of 
hypothesis as an example of the analysis of the mathematicians - includes a series of hypotheses meant to 
answer the question whether or not virtue can be taught. There are two significant features of the method 
of the geometers that point us towards their relevance for our philosophical problems in the Meno.
First, the hypotheses are structured and organized to follow the diorismic orientation of the 
mathematical example of analysis. A diorism is a form of geometrical reasoning that seeks to find the 
conditions for the possibility of a construction. Since constructions are of the nature of an unelaborated 
hypothesis, the purpose of the philosophical diorism will be to work out the conditions for the possibility of 
an assumed hypothesis.
Second, the hypotheses refer to a reduction of one problem to another with a more tractable 
solution. In the geometrical problem we are to determine whether a certain rectilinear figure could be 
constructed along the diameter of a circle by examining the hypothesis: “If this triangle is such that, when 
laid along the given line [as a rectangle of equal area] it is short by a space as large as the figure laid along 
it, then I think that one thing follows, whereas another thing follows if this cannot be done. So I am willing 
to tell you on this hypothesis, about inscribing the triangle, whether it is impossible or not”(87b).
Socrates then suggests that they should do the same with virtue: “let us investigate whether it is 
teachable or not by means of a hypothesis, and say this: Among the things existing in the soul, of what sort 
is virtue, that it should be teachable or not? First, if it is another sort than knowledge, is it teachable or not, 
or, as we were saying, recollectable”(87b)? As with the geometrical problem we are going to examine the 
hypothesis of whether virtue is teachable by considering some “reduced” set of conditions: If it meets the 
condition, then one thing follows, if not, then another.
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As in the mathematical problem, the philosophical “contrariai pair” is set up as a mutually exclusive 
set of conditionals. The first fork is put forward as a strong assertion by Socrates: “Isn’t it plain to 
everyone that a man is not taught anything except knowledge (87c)?” This statement can be logically 
restructured as “ If not knowledge, then not teachable.”
The second fork, which Socrates offers up almost immediately, is the more recognizable 
conditional: “If virtue is knowledge then it is teachable (87c).” The two conditionals together seem to 
make up the kind of pair needed to meet the conditions of our diorism : If virtue is knowledge then it is 
teachable, and if virtue is not knowledge then it is not teachable.
We should take note of the logical structure of these two Contrariai Pairs. They are both (the 
geometrical and the one about the teachability of virtue) set up as exclusive and exhaustive contraries, or as 
not admitting any middle. This puts both sets of hypotheses on the same footing as Meno’s paradox. There 
is only the possibility of teachability and knowledge or non-teachability and not knowledge. There can be 
no third alternative.
But the Slave Boy problem (Double Square) raised the possibility of there being such a middle 
ground. The unknown had been seemingly learned. The examination of the hypothesis of whether virtue is 
teachable will be equally an examination of the conditions whereby this middle ground between contrary 
propositions may be established. Socrates will need to establish some kind of propositional “middle” 
between these contraries, corresponding to the “mean” of the Double Square problem.
This seeking “middles” also returns us to one of the original meanings of analysis: “It follows, then, 
that in all our inquiries, we inquire either (a) whether there is a middle or (b) what the middle is, for the 
cause is the middle, and in all cases it is this that is sought {Post. Anal. B, 90a, 5). In this sense the Slave 
Boy or the Double Square problem is a kind of analysis since it sought to find a “middle”: the mean 
proportional between the sides of the given square.
There are some features we should note about the setting up of this pair of conditionals. First we 
must evaluate whether or not the conditionals are really exhaustively exclusive. It is clear that one of the 
possibilities that this pair excludes is that there might be some knowledge that is not teachable. That this 
possibility is excluded becomes immediately evident in Socrates’ rephrasing of the pair in terms of the 
contrapositive of the negative conditional - If virtue is not knowledge then it is not teachable = If teachable 
then knowledge:
S: We thought it could be taught if it was knowledge? - Yes.
S: And that it was knowledge, if it could be taught? - Quite so (98d).
This restructuring of the hypotheses makes it clearer that the condition for the exclusivity of the 
original two conditionals is that they together, as restructured, make up such a biconditional. Or, in other 
words, teaching and knowledge must be interchangeable if the conditionals are to be convertible with one 
another. So that if we have a convertible syllogism (i.e. one with a biconditional major premise), then there 
will not be a kind of knowledge that is unteachable, for the contrariai pair will be mutually exclusive (If 
teachable then knowledge and if not teachable then not knowledge).
We have seen in the Meno, Plato is working with what approximates to a traditional approach to the 
convertibility of arguments. The condition for the convertibility of an analysis into a synthesis - the 
exchanging of the minor premise and the conclusion - is the biconditionality, or conversion of the major 
premise:
Analysis Synthesis
All P is M All M is P (Convertible Major Premise)
All S is P (Hypothesis) All S is M
All S is M (Show to be true) All S is P (Demonstrated Hypothesis)
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In analysis we assume what we wish to prove; for example, “All S is P” in the syllogism on the left. 
If we can show that the assumed hypothesis leads to a true conclusion, we can then conclude that the 
corresponding synthetic syllogism is valid: i.e. that the major premise converts (is a biconditional).
It should be clarified at this point that we have been referring to convertibility in two fundamentally 
distinct senses. Individual propositions may convert and arguments may also be said to convert. With 
propositions, conversion is just the exchanging of the subject and predicate. This kind of exchange is 
always valid with two kinds of propositions: particular positive statements (Some S are P/ Some P are S) 
and negative universal statements (No S are P/ No P are S). In order for positive universally categorical 
propositions (logically similar to conditional propositions) to be convertible they must be biconditional or 
syntactically equivalent (All S are P and All P are S).
It is the issue of the convertibility of syllogisms that brings us to the second meaning of analysis and 
its relationship to the issue of virtue and its teachability. In mathematical demonstrations there are two 
distinct kinds of syllogism - analytic and synthetic. Synthetic syllogisms move deductively, or with 
necessity, from the more knowable universal towards the less knowable phenomena. Since they begin with 
some universal principle as their major premise, there is no “gain” in knowledge through such syllogisms.
Analytic syllogisms work in the reverse direction, from the less known, particular phenomenon, 
towards some universal, ruling principle. In mathematics such analyses are both deductive and ampliative. 
A “scientific demonstration” in mathematics involves the development of an analytic syllogism that is then 
converted into a synthetic syllogism.Mathematical analyses are “always or mostly” convertible, and that is 
why they may be translated directly into synthetic deductions (Aristotle, Post.Anal.7Sa5). Philosophical 
analyses, on the other hand, because a true conclusion can be deduced from false premises, are most often 
not convertible. Aristotle held that the advantage in the conversion of mathematical analyses has to do with 
the fact that mathematicians take as their premises, not accidental attributes, but definitions.
Socrates’ concern for the way in which Meno is examining the question of the teachability of virtue 
can be made clearer if we rewrite our conditional arguments into categorical syllogisms:
Meno ’s Syllogism - 
Knowledge is teachable 
Virtue is knowledge 
Virtue is teachable [hypothesis]
It is clear from this syllogism that the conditional that Meno seems to prefer - if virtue is 
knowledge, then it is teachable - will not satisfy the conditions of the analytical method. In Meno’s 
syllogism we are assuming that virtue is knowledge in order to prove that it is teachable. In the analytical 
method the reverse is called for: “Now analysis is a method of taking that which is sought as though it were 
admitted and passing from it through its consequences in order to something which is admitted as a result 
of synthesis.”2 The analysis that we are to examine is the nature of a proof procedure for attempting to 
demonstrate that which we first have to assume.
We are again led back to the other horn of the Contrariai Pair. When we translate this other 
conditional - if virtue is teachable then it is knowledge - into its syllogistic form, we finally attain the 
analytical proof that is called for:
Socrates ’ Analytic Syllogism - 
The teachable is knowledge 
Virtue is teachable [hypothesis]
Virtue is knowledge
2 Pappus, “Treasury of Analysis,” Greek Mathematical Works (Cambridge, 1993), p.597.
In this syllogism we are correctly assuming the hypothesis that we want to verify - that virtue is 
teachable. If it leads to something not true, it is incorrect: “If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, 
you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow 
from it agree with one another or contradict one another (Phaedo 101d).” If, however, we can confidently 
assert the truth of the conclusion, and the major premise is convertible, we can proceed to convert the entire 
syllogism to the demonstration of our hypothesis, Meno’s syllogism above.
We should anticipate, however, some difficulty with the convertibility of knowledge and 
teachability. The inconsistency of our two arguments on the teachability of virtue hints at some 
equivocation in the use of these three terms. In order to find the relationship between knowledge and 
teachability, it is likely that we will have to seek for some “middle” that mediates between them.
If we are to understand how Plato wishes us to utilize geometrical analysis to unravel this 
conceptual equivocation, the math problem must help us shed some light on the nature of the convertibility 
of concepts.
The Mathematical Background
The second problem of the Meno (86d-87c) is a particular kind of analysis known as a “locus” 
problem. We have also noted that this particular locus is a diorism. Proclus recounts that one of Plato’s 
students, Leon, first developed diorism as a formal method.
Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Book o f Euclid’s Elements, informs us about the 
distinctively philosophic interpretation of locus theorems. First, he informs us that Chrysippus “likened 
theorems of this sort to the (Platonic) Ideas.”3 Different than the triangular construction problems of the 
first half of Book I, locus constructions are determined by “ a position of a line or surface producing one 
and the same property.”4 As such these constructions can be viewed as paradigmatic of the activity of 
participation, “ For just as the Ideas embrace the generation of an indefinite number of particulars within 
determinate limits, so also in these theorems an indefinite number of cases are comprehended within 
determinate loci.”5 Proclus shows us how this locus-idea can model such paradoxical phenomenon as an 
infinite number of different parallelograms that can each be applied to the same base between the same 
parallel lines, all with the same area. The perimeter of these figures can increase indefinitely without any 
increment of area: “Their equality is shown to result from this limitation; for the height of the parallels, 
which remains the same while an indefinite number of parallelograms can be thought of on the same base, 
shows all these parallelograms to be equal to one another.”
This modeling of the locus problem as a manifestation of indefinite instances under the 
determination of a single Idea, recalls the philosophical problem of determining the definitional 
relationship between confused concepts by examining their respective extensional ranges6. The 
geometrical conditions that determine the range that the locus “rules”, must somehow be translatable with 
the philosophical conditions of virtue and teachability if we are to sort out how Plato means for us to utilize 
this problem.
Aristotle names his work on the dialectical development of conceptual relations the topos and this 
term in its Latin form, locus, takes on the meaning of developing the conceptual range of a topic. Topoi or 
loci are precisely that method by which logicians work out the range and scope of their conceptual tools.
For Aristotle and latter rhetoricians these terms remained parasitic on their origins in analytical geometry.
' Proclus, A commentary on the First Book o f Euclid’s Elements, (Princeton 1992), p. 31 1.
4 Ibid. p. 310.
5 p. 311.
6 Kant utilizes the locus of a circle to illustrate this same property of mathematical concepts in the Critique o f Pure Reason, 
(Indianapolis, 1987), p. 239-40.
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The second mathematical problem of the Meno is a ‘solid’ locus problem. This means that it 
involves techniques and concepts that require in introduction of the third or “solid” dimension: complex 
curves derived from conic sections. The problem is to determine whether a certain rectilinear area ‘X’ car 
be inscribed as a triangle in a given circle of radius ‘a’ (86e).
As an analysis, we first assume that this can be done (specifically as an isosceles triangle7). We the 
must show that the constructed isosceles triangle is equal in area to a rectangle constructed on the díamete 
such that the rectangle on the remaining portion of the diameter is similar to the one first constructed. Thi 
characteristic is the equivalent of showing that the “half base” of the isosceles triangle is the mean 
proportional between the segments of the diameter (because it is the altitude of a triangle inscribed in a 
semicircle)(Figs. 1 A & B):
7 Although any given triangular area can be constructed as an isosceles triangular area, the question of whether the scalene are 
always less than the isosceles area is not answered until after our analysis is completed - with the equilateral being shown to b 
the greatest triangular area.






The isosceles triangle (ACG) will always be bisected by the diameter (AF) of the circle. In other 
words, the two halves of the isosceles triangle can be said to be equal to a rectangle (ABCD) constructed 
onto that diameter.
By this construction we can see that the given condition can be satisfied by all rectangles one of 
whose sides lies on the given circle (AD), with one pair of opposed vertices (A, E) situated on the 
circumference. This condition means that angle ACF will always be a right angle and the altitude, CD, of 
the inscribed right triangle will always give us the required proportionality between the lines, 
AD:CD::CD:DF. So our original problem, that of applying an area as a triangle inscribed in a given circle, 
has been reduced to that of applying the original triangular area to the diameter of that given circle, in such 
a way that the applied rectangle (ABCD) and the rectangle constructible on the remainder of the diameter 
(CEFD), are similar. This similarity is given by the relationship of mean proportionality.
This is where the difficult work begins. In order to determine the areal conditions under which such 
mean proportionality will be possible, it is necessary to find that limiting value for which they will not 
attain - the maximum beyond which failure results. That is, it must be determined which isosceles triangle 
has the largest area. Intuitively, it is obvious that the triangle that meets this requirement is the equilateral: 
however, the problem is to prove the same.
The way in which this feat is accomplished is to realize that if one considers one vertex of the 
isosceles triangle as lying on a rectangular hyperbola (xy = b2, where b2 is the required area), and another as 
fixed at the origin, then the intersections of the different possible hyperbolae with the given circle (x2 *+ y2 *= 
2ax) represent those points where a second vertex of an isosceles triangle can be located to generate an 
inscribed isosceles triangle with area b2, such that the first vertex, located at the origin, is such that the line 
connecting the two vertices (AE) indicates one of the two triangular sides of equal length.. The triangular 
area is maximized at the point where there is only a single solution, where the hyperbola is exactly tangent 
to the circle. This solution is the equilateral triangle (Figure 1 C).8
In the figure, triangle AEG is constructed to be equal in area to the given rectangle, x=b2. The 
hyperbolic curve, EE' gives all the rectangular solutions (two or one) for a given area.
To transform this analysis into a synthesis, we must exchange the minor premise (the inscription of 
the triangle) and the conclusion (the equating of the given figure to the Applied Rectangle) and show that 
the major premise is convertible. The major premise states that the “half base” of the inscribed triangle 
determines two similar rectangles. The converse of this condition is also true - that the similarity of the two 
rectangles on the diameter determines the inscribability of the equivalent triangle. So we have successfully 
reduced our original problem - whether a rectilinear area could be inscribed in a given circle as a triangle - 
to whether that same area could be constructed as a rectangle on the diameter of that same circle, such that 
“it is deficient by a figure similar to the very figure which is applied (87a).” It is this condition of the 
convertibility of the relationship between the rectangular similarity and the inscribability that allows the 
convertibility of the analysis into a synthesis.
As we showed earlier, this condition of the reduced construction - the similarity of the rectangles - 
amounts to establishing that one pair of opposed vertices (A, E) will be situated on the circumference of the 
circle. In this way the side of the applied rectangle in contact with the circle will always determine the 
vertex of an inscribed right angle, guaranteeing the required similarity, since the altitude to the hypotenuse 
of a right triangle is the mean proportion between the sections of the hypotenuse. This condition of a
This diorismic finding of the maximum value of a hyperbolic function approximates the equivalence of modem techniques in
differential calculus. Viete and Fermat “rediscovered” the procedure in a comment of Archimedes on the symmetry of finding
roots for a quadratic equation. Viete had noticed in a comment of Pappus on Archimedes Proposition 61, that the constants of an
equation could reveal more than just the roots, but also the “unique and the least” parts of the curve. This clue led Fermat
directly into an investigation of the nature of the symmetry axes of higher curves and the relationship between tangencies and
maxima-minima (Mahoney, pp 150-7).
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second rectangular vertex lying on the circle may be represented as a hyperbola intersecting the circle. The 
hyperbola shows us that for sufficiently small rectangular areas, there are two points of intersection or 
distinct isosceles triangles. Only in the case where the hyperbolic curve is tangent to the circle will there be 
only a single solution, and in this case it is the maximum inscribable area - the equilateral triangle.
This problem is significant both mathematically and philosophically. The interaction 
between the circular and hyperbolic loci represents an equation of the fourth degree (x2 [2ax - x2]= b4)9. 
This solution of the “cubic” equation is exactly that of another problem that Plato is reputed to have solved 
- the Double Cube or Delian Problem10. The problem was to find the length of a side of the altar at Delos, a 
perfect cube, if the volume was to be doubled. All of the solutions involve different ways in which to find 
two means between two given magnitudes. Archytas’ solution specifically involves the utilization of curves 
in three dimensions, and is termed a “solid” locus problem. Analogously, the two problems in the Meno 
are examples of using plane and solid loci problems for finding the double of plane and solid figures. The 
playful possibilities evoked by the parallel between the Double Square (first problem) and the Double Cube 
(second problem) strongly point to Plato’s sense of “measured” levity11. And as Socrates teasingly reminds 
us at the end of the dialogue, the mathematician or statesman who could resolve the problem of defining 
knowledge, surely “would be just like that solid reality among shadows (Meno).”12
There is also the interesting connection between finding two means in the Double Cube problem 
and, the mention of the same relationship raised latter in the Timaeus. There Plato asserts that between two 
“solids”, it is necessary that there be two means as bonds (Plato, Timaeus, 32b). It is this condition that 
establishes the necessity for there being four elements. Now most people analyze this problem in the 
Timaeus as one of merely developing a continuous proportion with four terms 3. But the problem is 
specifically set up as one of finding two means between two given magnitudes.
Just like finding a single mean proportion was the equivalent of solving a quadratic equation, the 
finding of two mean proportions was the way in which Greek mathematicians typically solved cubic 
equations14. We must now begin to wonder what significance the finding of “double middles” has for 
clarifying our philosophical dilemma.
Reconciling the Two Analyses
But how does Plato’s locus analysis determinably guide the inquiry into the convertibility of 
knowledge and teachability? The convertibility of two terms makes some assumptions about the scope of 
their meanings. Two terms that have identical referents are extensionally convertible with each other. To 
the degree that the locus diorism is to bring clarity to the logic of the philosophy then it must confirm 
Proclus’ observation about determining the definitional scope of Ideas.
It is this key insight, that of the relationship between good definitions and the nature of inclusion, 
whether within a “class” or a “species” or a “category”, which calls up a picture of our geometrical 
problem. Our mathematical problem is to determine the conditions for when one kind of geometrical figure 
(a triangular area equal to a given rectangle) can be inscribed or included within another kind of figure 
(given circle). The problem involves the explicit examination of the conditions for this possibility of an 
“inclusion”. It is this shared imagery of determining when one class or figure may be determined to “fit” *1024
8 Heath, p. 301.
10 Ibid. p. 287.
11 The references in the Statesman to the “dunamis of two feet” and the “dunamis of twice two feet” corresponds closely to this 
way in which mathematicians referred to finding the two means in the double cube problem. The Statesman is a dialogue 
concerned with the problem whether we could ever “duplicate” the wisdom of the original law-giver (Double Cube).
12 Tr. Guthrie.
|j Francis Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (New York, 1957), p. 47.
14 Heath, History, p. 252.
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into another class or figure that intimately ties these two problems, the mathematical and the philosophical, 
together.
My thesis is that there is a hidden logos in this dialogue. It is not the erroneous proof that virtue is 
not knowledge because it is unteachable. It is rather an examination of the subtleties of logical form, and 
the ways in which mathematical procedure can guide our philosophical precision. The dialogue holds a 
key to the problem of convertibility in relation to logical and geometric demonstrations.
Before one can construct a relationship between virtue, knowledge and teachability, one must be 
able to identify which in turn has the wider scope. This clarification of scope is the means by which the 
equivocation between terms may be eliminated, making definitions more precise. In examining the 
relationship between virtue and knowledge, Socrates showed that the scope of knowledge is seen to 
completely contain that of virtue, “but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not encompass, we 
would be right to suspect that it [virtue] is a kind of knowledge {Meno 87e).” This explicit reference to one 
idea “containing” another recalls the locus problem that is the model of the discussion. The geometrical 
construction is supposed to bring the same clarity to the relationship between knowledge and teachability.
In the geometric analysis, we are to determine whether the area of a given triangular figure could be 
inscribed as a triangular area in a given circle. We first assumed that this could be done (as an isosceles 
triangle). We then showed that the constructed isosceles triangle was equal in area to a rectangle 
constructed on the diameter such that the rectangle on the remaining portion of the diameter was similar to 
the one first constructed. This characteristic is the equivalent of showing that the “half base” of the 
isosceles triangle is the mean proportional between the segments of the diameter (because it is the altitude 
of a triangle inscribed in a semicircle).
In order for this mathematical analysis to have a determinate effect on our philosophical problem, 
there would need to be some concrete conceptual relationship that can be reflected in our geometrical 
construction. In other words we must be able to identify some clear and concrete system of representation 
between our philosophical concepts and the figures of the geometrical construction.
Some of these correspondences seem uncontroversial. A circle completely contained by another 
circle represents well the relationship of inclusion (Euler Diagram). Plato certainly illuminates these kinds 
of logical relationships in a dialogue like the Euthyphro, where he asks “ is the holy loved by the gods 
because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods (10a)?” and “Then is all the just holy” Or is 
all the holy just, but not all the just holy - part of it holy, part something else (12a)?” Two congruent 
circles completely interposed on each other would represent identity or biconditionality between two 
concepts. This is the kind of relationship that he tricks Meno to agree to between knowledge and 
teachability.
In this representational schema there would necessarily be a distinction between curvilinear and 
rectilinear figures. The circular is considered most divine because it represents both a unity without parts 
and a perfection of balance and symmetry. Rectilinear figures, on the other hand, are archetypal of the 
material, the finite and the mortal. A triangle within a circle, borrowing some of the Pythagorean theology 
expressed in the Timaeus might stand for a finite concept contained within an infinite or immutable idea. 
This might more appropriately represent the relationship between a divine idea like knowledge and a 
“changeable” like opinion or teachability.





The value of the construction in helping us determine whether knowledge and virtue are 
interchangeable lies “visible” before our eyes. Any triangle equal to the rectangle so constructed that the 
Remainder Rectangle is similar, can be “included” within the circle. But it is evident that none of these 
triangles is equivalent to the circle. The relationship of inscribability, like that between knowledge and 
teachability is asymmetric. The triangle may be included within the circle, but not vice versa. The diagram 
has shown us that if there is to be any convertibility between knowledge and teachability, it will not be 
categorical (syntactical), for there is no equivalence (biconditionality) between them. If there is to be 
convertibility, it can at most be conditional, as determined by some semantic relationship or “middle” 
between the two terms.
At this point it is appropriate to take in the full scope of our diagram and “see” which relationships 
can convince us of their necessary truth, as the diagonal of the square finally transfixed the slave boy’s 
belief.
First we can note how the mathematical diagram in fact reconciles our two senses of analysis. The 
seeking of the convertibility of knowledge and teachability has been exactly replaced with the finding of a 
“middle”, or mean proportion in this case. The condition for the inscribability of the translated triangle is 
exactly that the height of the Applied Rectangle (ED) be the mean proportion between the segments of the 
diameter. But this same picture also betrays the problem with such a mean. For each hyperbola intersects 
the circle at two points (E'D7E"D"), determining not one mean, but two “middles.” As in the Timaeus, the 
distance between knowledge and teachability is apparently of a “solid” degree.
This double middle is of course well established in the dialogue. Between knowledge (recollective 
teachability for Socrates) and opinion (teachability for Meno), there are two middles of true opinion and a 
reasoned account. But as long as these middles are separate, neither can be an adequate bridge to 
knowledge. Here again our diagram comes to our aid. It is precisely at that “limit” point where the 
hyperbola is exactly tangent to our circle that the two means converge into a single point (E). Somehow 
appropriately, the isosceles triangle determined by that convergent point is the one that signifies the 
maximum area for a triangle that can be inscribed in that circle - the “divine” equilateral triangle.
From our construction, we may conclude that while knowledge, as the circular, has a kind of Divine 
Nature, human knowledge, and along with it, virtue “within the human soul” is more of the nature of a 
mortal activity, as portrayed by the perfectly balanced equilateral triangle. The outer circle represents the 
Divine Ideas - Knowledge and the Good. The equilateral triangle represents the optimum capacity of 
human action. Its rectilinear nature makes it appropriate for representing the human condition of 
becoming. Its paradigmatic significance as optimum makes it ideal for signifying the instantiation of the 
Ideas in human knowing and virtuous action. Only an “ideal” with some kinship to the perfect could 
possibly represent the Divine as captured within the human15.
It is interesting to note exactly how the equilateral triangle, as representing the best of human 
possibility, can be said to “partake” of the divine (the circle). For one, the triangle is “limited” by the 
circle. This one condition of the relationship between Form and participant refers back to the example of 
form as “shape” or “boundary”. Socrates’ first example of what a form might be was that of the limiting 
nature of the shape of a solid {Meno 76a). But the equilateral triangle may also be said to “imitate” the 
circle. It is the only triangle for which all of the parts are equal, and it has optimum symmetry. Although 
the circle does not have parts in the traditional sense, there is a way in which it can be understood as an 
equilateral polygon with an unlimited number of sides (Eudoxus)16.
15 This interpretation of the application of the geometric construction to the philosophical relationships is strongly confirmed in 
another dialogue. In considering whether the man who understands justice itself will be able to recognize the more profane 
version, Socrates ponders whether he be, “sufficiently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divine 
sphere itself’ but cannot recognize that justice which is human (Philebus 62b). This geometry of the Meno has something to do 
with determining the relationship between divine and “mixed” knowledge.
16 Heath, p. 327.
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On closer perusal of our figure we begin to sort out the difficulties of our conceptual relationships. 
Knowledge will clearly not “fit” within the scope of the teachable, but we also recognize that the converse 
proposition, that all the teachable was knowledge, is itself problematic. What can we conclude about the 
“remainder” rectangle? As a rectilinear figure it fits our condition that it is in some sense teachable, but as 
“outside” the conditions of our construction, it cannot be counted as in any way “knowable”. So there is 
apparently not only knowledge that is unteachable -Divine Knowledge, but also that which is teachable that 
is not knowledge - mere practice or artless technique.
We are forced to recognize at this point the double irony that Meno and Socrates have each been 
discussing two distinct and incompatible ideas of the “teachable”. For Meno, as a student of Gorgias, 
knowledge and learning/teaching just are the memorizing of the parts of rhetoric. There is no difference for 
Meno between the teachable and knowledge. They are both just a matter of learning the pieces or parts of 
something like virtue. They are the artless practice or empeiria.17
For Socrates, the teachable and knowledge are both of the immutable forms. Teachability, as the 
method of prompting recollection, is represented by the rectangular figure to be inscribed on the diameter. 
There are two conditions for the teachable to be truly methodos. First it must be a techne. Human technes, 
as finite activities with distinct steps, can be well pictured by the given rectilinear figure (triangle). Second, 
to be “knowable” a true art or techne must also be “limited” or unified by some Good or end. This is the 
role of capturing or limiting the triangle within the circle.
This recognition of the difference between that which is teachable with method, and that which is 
teachable by “mindless practice”, or empeiria, helps focus our interpretation of the construction. The 
“remainder” rectangle is that teaching that is outside knowledge, and therefore, “unknowable”.
But is it thoroughly unknowable? The Applied Rectangle (ACED) represents that knowledge which 
is directly teachable as methodos. The Remainder Rectangle (DEFB) would then represent that knowledge 
which is beyond the directly teachable. Does this make it beyond human knowing? By its determinate 
similarity to the rectangle of teachable knowledge, it seems to defy the label of complete unteachability. 
Somehow we have a determinate relationship for this “unteachable” by analogy or similarity with that 
which was directly teachable. That which is beyond human knowing, as not being directly teachable, is yet 
accessible indirectly by a relationship: “we were saying that people get the idea of what is likely through its 
similarity to the truth. And we just explained that in every case the person who knows the truth knows best 
how to determine similarities (Phaedrus273d).” So while empirical learning may not be knowledge proper, 
it may yet be proportionately related to knowledge. It is not the true, but only the “likely” or probable 
(273d). Our ignorance is somehow “measurable”.
In seeking for a middle term between Divine Knowledge and teachability, in order to be able to then 
convert the two terms, we have fallen upon a pair of “middles.” Each of these complementary middles, 
true opinion and a reasoned account, stands in turn as a mean between a paired set of Applied (methodos) 
and Remainder (empeiria) rectangles. What our diagram has convinced us of is that that human 
knowledge, which may be convertible with Divine Knowledge, is the convergence between true opinion 
and a reasoned account. This convergent middle is that represented by the paradigm of the equilateral 
triangle, the largest triangle inscribable within the given circle.
Conclusion
It has been my contention that Plato utilizes these geometrical constructions to parse and precise the 
conceptual definitions and relationships of the philosophical conversation. In order to reconcile the 
contradictory syllogisms for the teachability of virtue it was necessary to eliminate the equivocation within 
the concepts of knowledge and teachability. We had to find some middle term(s) that would bridge the 
equivocation, and allow us to eventually convert teachability and knowledge. *13
17 There is a longer account of the nature of this “artless technique” in the Phaedrus 265d-274c.
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The fact that the construction led us to the convergent limit of two means into a single, optimal 
paradigm, confirms that such a paradigm, as ideal human knowledge would be convertible with both 
teachability and Divine Knowledge.
Such a convertibility, however, would not be categorical. Only an identity, or biconditional 
comports that level of convertibility. Rather, there is a conditional convertibility of human knowledge with 
both teachability and Divine Knowledge and the conditions are those specifically laid out by the 
construction: The convergence of the double means into an optimizing paradigm.
The role of paradigm, or ideal example, in the Platonic theory of knowledge is illustrated in an 
interesting way by the special isosceles triangle., the equilateral. Diorisms are fundamentally involved with 
solid locus problems. These are problems that are resolved by the determining of a limit - a maximum or a 
minimum. The equilateral triangle represents the limit of the relationship between the hyperbolic function 
(area of rectangle) and the circular function.
It is through this characteristic as a maximum that the paradigm triangle may help us understand 
how this example of analysis overcomes what Aristotle cites as the major fault in attempting to convert 
analyses18 In examining the fault within most attempted conversions, Aristotle notes:
Some thinkers draw conclusions that do not follow syllogistically because they take [as a 
middle term] that which belongs to both [the major and the minor terms]. For example, this is what 
Caeneus does when he concludes that fire increases in a multiple proportion; for, according to him, 
both fire and such proportions increase fast. Now [if the premises are stated] in this manner, no 
syllogism is possible, but [there is a syllogism] if the fastest proportion is a multiple proportion and 
if fire increases according to the fastest proportion (Post. Anal. 78a, 1-5).
The reason why true opinion with a reasoned account is convertible with knowledge is that it is 
demonstrated to be the maximal possibility for knowledge within the human soul.
The optimal status of the equilateral triangle also makes it the “middle” or liminal case that defeats 
the skeptical claim against the possibility of knowledge. It is, in some sense, neither fully “within” nor 
“outside” the containing circle, as it represents the single point of tangency between the hyperbolic and 
circular functions19. It shows that there must be a continuum between the completely knowable (totally 
within the locus) and the completely unknowable (totally outside the locus). And qualitatively the 
equilateral triangle is an optimum imitation of the Divine itself. It is perfect within its constraints as a 
rectilinear figure. It uniquely occupies that space between the Divine and the mortal. And perfect images 
of reality are conditionally convertible with that reality. The measurable conditions of that perfection being 
the both the limits and the possibilities of our knowledge, as well as our virtue.
Equally this resolution answers the contemporary doubts of Gettier. The true opinion and reasoned 
account cannot be disassociated. For knowledge to be convertible with teachability, the two axes of 
knowledge, true opinion and its reasoned account, remain in reciprocal proportion to each other as they 
converge at the paradigm.
What can we finally say that Plato has definitively shown us with his exhibition of analytic 
geometry? First, he has reconfirmed the epistemological thesis of the dialogue by making visible before 
our eyes the solution merely discussed in the conversation. We are enabled to see the convergence of the 
two partial means (true opinion and reasonable account) into the limiting point that is the boundary of 
continuity between total knowing and total ignorance. We can see not only that there must be such 
continuity, but also are shown how to achieve it.
18 If a true conclusion could not be proved from false [remises], analysis would be easy, for then [true premises and true 
conclusions] would of necessity be convertible (Post. Λ««/. 78a, 10).
19 This would be the case is being completely “within” the circle was defined as having “two” points of contact between the 
hyperbolic and circular loci.
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Second, we are simultaneously shown the conditions for the possibility of converting an analysis 
into a synthesis. This is accomplished by extending the syntactical determination of the syllogism deep 
into the semantics grounding of our concepts.
Logical necessity is based on the spatial relationships of inclusion and exclusion, as mirrored in the 
interlocking circles of Euler/Venn extensional representation. If we stay solely within the logic of syntax, 
our syllogisms will remain the empty in the Kantian “analytical” sense, and the language we are forced to 
implement within those syllogisms will remain semantically ambiguous.
With geometric construction, Plato has armed us with the tools to extend the reach of syntactic rules 
into the realm of semantic relationships. Geometrical relationships are determinate, yet are substantially 
richer than the merely discrete relationship of inclusion/exclusion. The Meno analysis specifically 
demonstrates that the syntactical relationship of inclusion/exclusion can be systematically reduced to a 
determinate semantics of similarity and proportion. Plato has disclosed for us a geometrically determined 
semantics capable of setting our vague and confused concepts into a measured order - a Philosophers’
Stone that can resolve base meanings into Divine ideas.
Third, we can understand that such paradigmatic relationships just are how we teach and learn the 
virtues. No one can have us memorize the steps to virtue. But the setting and following of virtuous action 
is the way home, and now Plato has given us the map to check our directional sense.
And finally, we have at least fulfilled our obligation to Plato to attempt to workout this puzzle he 
has dropped in our path. For clearly, without the courage to attack such intractable knots within the 
conversations we cannot be the heirs to any Platonic legacy:
I do not insist that my arguments is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both 
in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that 
one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe it is not possible to find 
out what we do not know and that we must not look for it {Meno 86b).
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